D. Boneh and R. Venkatesan have recently proposed an approach to proving that a reasonably small portions of most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key modulo a prime are as secure the the whole key. Some further improvements and generalizations have been obtained by I. M. Gonzales Vasco and I. E. Shparlinski. E. R. Verheul has obtained certain analogies of these results in the case of Diffie-Hellman keys in extensions of finite fields, when an oracle is given to compute a certain polynomial function of the key, for example, the trace in the background field. Here we obtain some new results in this direction concerning the case of so-called "unreliable" oracles.
Introduction
Let IF q denote a finite field of q elements.
D. Boneh and R. Venkatesan [1] have proposed an approach to proving that about n 1/2 of most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key modulo an n-bit prime are as secure as the whole key. Unfortunately the proof of their main result is not quite correct (because the multipliers in their proof of Theorem 2 of [1] are not uniformly distributed thus Theorem 1 of their paper does not apply). The proof of Theorem 3 in [1] , dealing with other cryptosystems, suffers from a similar problem. Their results have been corrected and generalized by I. M. Gonzales Vasco and I. Shparlinski [6, 7] . A detailed survey of several other results of this type (including the RSA cryptosystem and the discrete logarithm problem) has recently been given in [5] .
E. R. Verheul [10] among several other results, considers a similar problem for the Diffie-Hellman key in arbitrary finite fields. However instead of studying the security of the most significant bits the paper [10] deals with the security of values of sparse polynomials at the values of the DiffieHellman keys. More precisely, let us fix an element γ ∈ IF q and a polynomial
. It has been shown in [10] , under certain natural conditions, that if we are given an oracle which for each pair (γ x , γ y ) with some integers x and y returns the value of F (γ xy ), than this oracle can be used to construct a polynomial time algorithm to compute the Diffie-Hellman key γ xy . We remark that polynomials F can be of very large degree (thus direct solving the equation F (γ xy ) = A is not feasible) but contain a reasonably small number of monomials. The result has been motivated by applications to the proof of security of a certain new cryptosystem, see [2, 8, 10] .
Here we obtain a generalization of Theorem 24 of [10] to the "unreliable" case, when oracle returns the result only for a certain very small fraction of inputs and returns an error message for other inputs.
Preparations
The following estimate on the number of zeros of sparse polynomials is a version of the similar result from [3, 4] . Lemma 1 For r ≥ 2 elements a 1 , . . . , a r ∈ IF * q and integers τ 1 , . . . , τ r ∈ Z Z let us denote by Q the number of solutions of the equation
Proof. It has been shown in Lemma 7 of [3] and Lemma 4 of [4] , see also Lemma 3.4 of [9] , that
Otherwise L 1/(r−1) − 1 ≥ 2L −1/(r−1) /3 and the result follows. ⊓ ⊔ Let us fix an element ϑ ∈ IF q of multiplicative order t.
Lemma 2 For m ≥ 2 elements a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ IF * q and integers e 1 , . . . , e m we denote by W the number of solutions of the equation
Then the bound
holds, where
gcd(e j − e i , t).
Proof. We write ϑ = g (q−1)/t where g is a primitive root of IF q and note that each solution u ∈ [0, t − 1] of the previous exponential equation gives rise to (q − 1)/t distinct solutions
where τ j = e j (q − 1)/t. Remarking that
from Lemma 1 we obtain that
as claimed. ⊓ ⊔
Security of Polynomial Transformations of the Diffie-Hellman Key
Let γ ∈ IF q be an element of multiplicative order t.
As in [10] we consider an m-sparse polynomial
where c 1 , . . . , c m ∈ IF * q and e 1 , . . . , e m are pairwise distinct modulo t. Let 0 < ε ≤ 1. Assume that we are given an oracle O F,ε such that for every x ∈ [0, t − 1], given the values of γ x and γ y , it returns F (γ xy ) for at least εt values of y ∈ [0, t − 1] and returns an error message for other values of y ∈ [0, t − 1].
The case ε = 1, that is, the case of a "noise-free" oracle has been considered in [10] .
We are ready to prove the main result. For simplicity we assume that t is a prime number, although analogues of our result hold for composite t as well. Nevertheless this case allows us to simplify some arguments and it is also one of the most practically important cases, see [2, 8, 10] .
Theorem 3 Let t be prime, m ≥ 2 and let an m-sparse polynomial F be given by (1) . Assume that
Given an oracle O F,ε , there exists a probabilistic algorithm which given γ x and γ y makes the expected number of at most 2mε . By the conditions of the theorem |U| ≥ εt. We also remark that if γ y is known then for any v ∈ [0, t − 1] the value of γ y+v can easily be computed as well. Put ϑ = γ x . Select a sequence of elements v uniformly and independently at random in the interval [0, t − 1] and for each of them feed γ x and γ y+v in the oracle O F,ε until we find an element u ∈ U and thus find the values of F γ x(y+u) . Let call this element u 1 . The expected number of oracle calls to find such an element is ε
We select elements v uniformly and independently at random in the interval [0, t − 1] until we find an element u k ∈ U such that
We remark that if the last determinant vanishes then u k satisfies an equation of the form
where, by the assumption (2), we have
Applying Lemma 2 we obtain that the number of elements u k ∈ U which satisfy the condition (3) is at least
Thus such an element u k ∈ U can be found in the expected number of at most 2ε −1 oracle calls with γ x and γ y+v where elements v are selected uniformly and independently at random in the interval [0, t − 1].
Therefore after the expected number of at most 2mε −1 oracle calls we obtain m elements u 1 , . . . , u m ∈ U with corresponding values of A j = F (ϑ y+u j ) for each j = 1, . . . , m and such that det (ϑ e i u j ) m i,j=1 = 0.
The rest of the proof follows essentially the same arguments as the proof of Theorem 24 of [10] . Indeed, we see that we have a nonsingular system of linear equations
from which the vector (c 1 ϑ e 1 y , . . . , c m ϑ emy ) can be found and thus we obtain the values of γ e 1 xy , . . . , γ emxy . Because m ≥ 2 and t is prime, at least one of e 1 , . . . , e m (which are pairwise distinct modulo t) is relatively prime to t. Say if gcd(e 1 , t) = 1 we define an integer f 1 ∈ [1, t − 1] from the congruence f 1 e 1 ≡ 1 (mod t) and compute
Remarking that besides the expected number of oracle calls is 2mε −1 and that the rest of the algorithm can be implemented in deterministic polynomial in m log q time, we obtain the desired result.
⊓ ⊔
Remarks
Let q = p r . Then the trace function
provides a natural example of a polynomial of the form (1). This function as well as the function
have been studied in [2] (with r = 6). Our results imply a stronger version of Lemma 2.1 of [2] and thus give more security assurance to the proposed there cryptosystem. The same comment also applies to the proposed in [8] XTR public key cryptosystem which is based on a more computationally efficient modification of the ideas of [2] . It is interesting to replace the condition that for each x ∈ [0, t − 1] the oracle O F,ε returns F (γ xy ) for at least εt values of y ∈ [0, t − 1] with a more natural condition that the oracle O F,ε returns F (γ xy ) for at least εt 2 pairs (x, y) ∈ [0, t − 1]
2 . It would also be very important to obtain similar results for the case where the oracle returns the correct value of F (γ xy ) for a certain portion of inputs and returns wrong results for other inputs (instead of the error message, thus wrong outputs cannot be immediately identified).
